Abstract-We make progress in the following three problems: 1. Constructing optimal seeded non-malleable extractors; 2. Constructing optimal privacy amplification protocols with an active adversary, for any possible security parameter; 3. Constructing extractors for independent weak random sources, when the min-entropy is extremely small (i.e., near logarithmic).
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of randomness extractors is a broad area and a fundamental branch of the more general study of pseudorandomness. Informally, randomness extractors are functions that transform biased probability distributions (weak random sources) into almost uniform probability distributions. Here we measure the entropy of a weak random source by the standard min-entropy.
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A source X is said to have min-entropy k if for any x, Pr[X = x] ≤ 2 −k . An (n, k)-source X is a distribution on n bits with min-entropy at least k.
It is well known that it is impossible to construct deterministic randomness extractors when the input is just one (arbitrary) weak random source, even if the min-entropy is as large as n − 1. A natural relaxation is then to give the extractor a short independent uniform seed, and such extractors are called seeded extractors. With this relaxation it is indeed possible to construct extractors that work for any weak random source with essentially any min-entropy. We now formally define such extractors. Through a long line of research we now have explicit constructions of seeded extractors with almost optimal parameters [25] , [26] , [37] .
In recent years, there has been much interest in the study of two other kinds of randomness extractors. The first one, known as non-malleable extractors (introduced by Dodis and Wichs [23] ), is a generalization of strong seeded extractors. 
Definition I.3 (Non-malleable extractor

|(nmExt(X, Y), nmExt(X, A(Y)), Y)− (U m , nmExt(X, A(Y)), Y)| ≤ .
The second one, known as multi-source extractors (first studied by Chor and Goldreich [12] ), is another natural relaxation of deterministic extractors for one weak random source, in the sense that now the input to the extractor are several (at least two) independent weak random sources. Curiously, although this problem was first studied around 30 years ago, it was not until recently that significant progress has been achieved.
The above two kinds of extractors are closely related, and in many cases techniques used for one can also be used to improve the constructions of the other. These connections have been demonstrated in a number of works (e.g., [11] , [30] - [32] , [34] ).
We now briefly discuss the motivations for these two kinds of extractors.
A. Non-malleable extractors and privacy amplification
The initial motivation for non-malleable extractors comes from the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary [6] , [7] , [39] . As a basic problem in information theoretic cryptography, privacy amplification deals with the case where two parties want to communicate with each other to convert their shared secret weak random source X into shared secret nearly uniform random bits. On the other hand, the communication channel is watched by an adversary Eve, who has unlimited computational power. To make this task possible, we assume two parties have local (non-shared) uniform random bits.
If Eve is passive (i.e., can only see the messages but cannot change them), this problem can be solved easily by applying the aforementioned strong seeded extractors. However, in the case where Eve is active (i.e., can arbitrarily change, delete and reorder messages), the problem becomes much more complicated. The major challenge here is to design a protocol that uses as few number of interactions as possible, and outputs a uniform random string R that has length as close to H ∞ (X) as possible (the difference is called entropy loss). A bit more formally, we pick a security parameter s, and if the adversary Eve remains passive during the protocol then the two parties should achieve shared secret random bits that are 2 −s -close to uniform. On the other hand, if Eve is active, then the probability that Eve can successfully make the two parties output two different strings without being detected should be 1 i.e., for any x, A(x) = x at most 2 −s . We refer the readers to [22] for a formal definition.
There has been a long line of work on this problem [1] , [9] , [19] , [21] - [23] , [27] , [29] , [30] , [33] , [38] , [45] . When the entropy rate of X is large, i.e., bigger than 1/2, there are known protocols that take only one round (e.g., [21] , [38] ). However these protocols all have very large entropy loss. When the entropy rate of X is smaller than 1/2, [23] showed that no one round protocol exists; furthermore the length of R has to be at least O(s) smaller than H ∞ (X). Thus, the natural goal is to design a two-round protocol with such optimal entropy loss. However, all protocols before the work of [22] either need to use O(s) rounds, or need to incur an entropy loss of O(s 2 ).
In [23] , Dodis and Wichs showed that explicit constructions of the aforementioned non-malleable extractors can be used to give two-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss. Using the probabilistic method, they also showed that non-malleable extractors exist when k > 2m + 2 log(1/ε) + log d + 6 and d > log(n − k + 1) + 2 log(1/ε) + 5. However, they were not able to give explicit constructions even for min-entropy k = n − 1. The first explicit construction of non-malleable extractors appeared in [22] , with subsequent improvements in [1] , [19] , [24] , [29] , [30] . All these constructions require the min-entropy of the weak source to be bigger than 0.49n, and thus only give two-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss for such min-entropy. Together with some other ideas, [22] also gives poly(1/δ) round protocols with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k ≥ δn, any constant δ > 0. This was subsequently improved by one of the authors in [30] to obtain a two-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k ≥ δn, any constant δ > 0. In the general case, using a relaxation of non-malleable extractors called non-malleable condensers, one of the authors [33] also obtained a two-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k ≥ C log 2 n, some constant C > 1, as long as the security parameter s satisfies k ≥ Cs 2 . For larger security parameter, the best known protocol with optimal entropy loss in [30] 
In a recent work, Chattopadhyay, Goyal and Li [10] constructed explicit non-malleable extractors with error ε, for min-entropy k = Ω(log 2 (n/ )) and seed-length d = O(log 2 (n/ )). This gives an alternative protocol matching that of [30] . Subsequently, Cohen [15] improved this result, and constructed non-malleable extractors with seed length d = O(log(n/ ) log((log n)/ )) and min-entropy k = Ω(log(n/ ) log((log n)/ )). In this work, he also gave another construction that worked for k = n/(log n) O(1) with seed-length O(log n). In a follow up, Cohen [16] constructed non-malleable extractors with seed length d = O(log n + log 3 (1/ )) and min-entropy k = Ω(d). However, in terms of the general error parameter ε, all of these results require min-entropy and seed length at least log 2 (1/ε), thus none of them can be used to improve the privacy amplification protocols in [33] .
A recent work by Aggarwal, Hosseini and Lovett [2] obtained some conditional results. In particular, they used a weaker variant of non-malleable extractors to construct privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss for k = Ω(log(1/ ) log n) assuming a conjecture in additive combinatorics.
B. Multi-source extractors for independent sources
As mentioned before, Chor and Goldreich [12] introduced the problem of designing extractors for two or more independent sources. Explicit constructions of such extractors can also be used in explicit constructions of Ramsey graphs ( [5] , [11] , [17] ). A simple probabilistic argument shows the existence of two-source extractors for min-entropy k ≥ log n + O(1). However, explicit constructions of such functions are extremely challenging.
Chor and Goldreich [12] proved that the innerproduct function is a two-source extractor for minentropy greather than n/2. It was not until 20 years later when Bourgain [8] broke the entropy rate 1/2 barrier and constructed a two-source extractor for minentropy 0.49n. Raz [44] obtained another construction which requires one source with min-entropy more than n/2 and the other source with min-entropy O(log n). Recently, Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [11] improved the situation substantially by constructing two-source extractors for min-entropy k ≥ polylog(n), with subsequent improvements obtained by Li [36] and Meka [40] . The ultimate goal here is to obtain two-source extractors matching the entropy bound given by the probabilistic method.
If we allow the extractor to have a constant number of sources instead of just two sources, then an exciting line of work [3] - [5] , [13] , [28] , [31] , [32] , [34] , [42] , [43] constructed extractors with excellent parameters. However, the smallest entropy these constructions can achieve is log 2+δ n for any constant δ > 0 [31] , which uses O(1/δ) + O(1) sources. In a very recent work, Cohen and Schulman [20] managed to break this "quadratic" barrier, and constructed extractors for O(1/δ) + O(1) sources, each with min-entropy log 1+δ n.
C. Our results
Non-Malleable Extractors
Our first result is a new construction of non-malleable extractors that breaks the log 2 (1/ε) barrier for min-entropy and seed length. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists a constant C > 0 s.t for all n, k ∈ N and any
We also construct a non-malleable extractor with seed-length O(log n) for min-entropy k = Ω(log n) and ≥ 2 − log 1−β (n) for any β > 0. Prior to this, explicit non-malleable extractors with seed-length O(log n) either requires min-entropy at least n/poly(log n) [15] or
Theorem 2. There exists a constant C > 0 s.t for and all n, k ∈ N with k ≥ C log n, any constant 0 < β < 1, and any ≥ 2
m , where d = O(log n) and m = Ω(log(1/ )). [15] , [16] in all cases except the case that ε is large enough (e.g., ≥ 2 − log 1/3 (n) ), where both [16] and our results require seed length and min-entropy O(log n).
Remark I.4. A careful examination reveals that our seed length and min-entropy requirement are better than those of
Note that given any error parameter ε, our nonmalleable extractor in Theorem 1 only requires minentropy and seed length log 1+o(1) (n/ε).
We also show how to further lower the min-entropy requirement of the non-malleable extractor in Theorem 1 at the expense of using a larger seed. We complement this result by constructing another non-malleable extractor with shorter seed-length than in Theorem 1 at the expense of larger entropy. We now state these results more formally.
Theorem 3. There exists a constant
(log log log(n/ ))
Theorem 4. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all n, k ∈ N and any > 0, with k ≥ (log(n/ )) 3 2
(log log log(n/ )) [35] further improved this result, and achieve nonmalleable extractors with seed length and entropy O(log n) + log(1/ )poly(log log(1/ )), and O(log n) + O(log(1/ ) log log(1/ )) respectively. Privacy Amplification Using Theorem 1 and the protocol in [23] , we immediately obtain a two-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss, for almost all possible security parameters.
Theorem 5. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for any security parameter s with
k ≥ (s + log n)2 C √ log(s+log n) ,
there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for (n, k)-sources with entropy loss O(log n+s) and communication complexity
, in the presence of an active adversary.
In particular, this gives us two-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss for security parameter s ≤ k 1−α for any constant α > 0.
Instead if we use the non-malleable extractor from Theorem 3, we obtain a two-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss, for even smaller min-entropy (at the expense of larger communication complexity). More formally, we have the following theorem. 
t-Non-Malleable Extractors and 2-Source Extractors
Our techniques for constructing non-malleable extractors can be generalized directly to construct t-nonmalleable extractors (non-malleable extractors with t tampering functions, see the full version of the paper for more details). Such t-non-malleable extractors were used in [11] to construct two-source extractors. With subsequent improvements [36] , [40] , the best known 2-source extractor for constant error requires min-entropy C(log n) 10 , and for polynomially small error requires min-entropy C(log n) 18 . By plugging in our improved t-non-malleable extractor, we obtain two-source extractors that require min-entropy (log n) 8 for constant error, and (log n) 14 for polynomially small error. By a well-known connection to Ramsey graphs (see [5] ), the constant error 2-source extractor implies an explicit 2 (log log n) 8 -Ramsey graph on n vertices.
Multi-Source Extractors
Next, we improve the entropy requirement in extractors for a constant number of independent sources. In particular, we give explicit extractors for O(1) sources, each having min-entropy log 1+o(1) (n). More formally, we have the following theorem. Theorem 7. There exist constants C > 0, C > 0 s.t for all n, k ∈ N with k ≥ log n2 C √ log log(n) and any constant > 0, 2 there exists an explicit function Ext :({0, 1} n ) C → {0, 1}, such that if X 1 , . . . , X C are independent (n, k) sources, then |Ext(X 1 , . . . , X C ) − U 1 | ≤ .
D. Non-malleable independence preserving merger
The barrier of log 2 (1/ε) in seed length and minentropy requirement of non-malleable extractors, as well as the barrier of log 2 n in min-entropy requirement of multi-source extractors mainly come from the fact that the previous constructions rely heavily on the "alternating extraction" based techniques. In [20] , Cohen and Schulman introduced a new object called independence preserving merger (IPM for short). This is the key component in their construction, which helps them to obtain the O(1/δ) + O(1) source extractor for min-entropy k ≥ log 1+δ n. The construction of the independence preserving merger in [20] is fairly complicated and takes up a bulk of work.
A key component in all of our constructions is a generalized, and much more efficient version of the independence preserving merger in [20] , which we call non-malleable independence preserving merger (NIPM for short). In addition, we believe that our construction of NIPM is simpler than the construction of IPM in [20] . We now define this object below. 
We present an explicit construction of an NIPM which requires seed length d = log(m/ )L o (1) for the case t = 1. More formally, we have the following theorem.
We have a more general version of the above theorem, for which we refer the reader to the full version, that works for general t. This is crucial for us to obtain our results on t-non malleable extractors and extractors for independent sources with near logarithmic min-entropy.
Using our NIPM, we construct a standard IPM introduced in the work of Cohen and Schulman [20] . We first define an IPM.
Definition I.6. A (L, k, t, , )-IPM : {0, 1}
Lm × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m1 satisfies the following property. Suppose
There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all integers m, L > 0, any > 0, and
As in the case of NIPM, we in fact construct an IPM for general t. The construction of IPM from NIPM is relatively straightforward, and using this explicit IPM we derive our improved results on extractors for independent sources. We note that there are several important differences between our IPM and the construction in [20] . First, we only require that there exists at least one "good" row X h in the matrix (i.e., X h is uniform even given X 1 h , . . . , X t h ). In contrast, the IPM in [20] requires that 0.99 fraction of the rows are good. Second, the construction of IPM in [20] offers a trade-off between the number of additional sources required and the min-entropy requirement of each source. In particular, they construct an IPM using b additional sources, each having min-entropy k = Ω(L 1/b log(n/ )). In contrast, we use just one additional source with minentropy k = Ω(L o (1) log(m/ε)), and works as long
In typical applications, we will have m ≈ k < n, so it suffices to set k = L o(1) log(n/ε). For all applications in this paper, we will choose L = O(log(n/ε)) and thus we get k = log 1+o(1) (n/ε). The fact that our IPM uses only one additional source improves significantly upon the IPM in [20] and is crucial for us to obtain an O(1) source extractor for min-entropy k = log 1+o(1) n.
We also present a more involved construction of a NIPM that uses a shorter seed in comparison to the NIPM in Theorem 8, but requires matrices with larger rows (i.e., m is required to be larger). More formally, we have the following result.
We use the NIPM from the above theorem in obtaining the non-malleable extractors in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
II. OUTLINE OF CONSTRUCTIONS
Here we give an informal and high level description of our constructions. Due to lack of space, we refer the reader to the full version of the paper for formal proofs of the results discussed in this section. We start with our non-malleable independence preserving merger (NIPM) with a uniform (or high entropy rate) seed.
A. Non-malleable independence preserving merger with uniform seed
For simplicity we start by describing the case of only one tampering adversary. Here, we have two correlated random variables X = (X 1 , . . . , X L ) and X = (X 1 , . . . , X L ), each of them is an L × m matrix. We have another two correlated random variables Y, Y . We assume the following conditions: (X, X ) is independent of (Y, Y ), each X i is uniform and there exists a j ∈ [L] such that X j is uniform even conditioned on X j , and Y is uniform. Our goal is to construct a function NIPM such that NIPM(X, Y) is uniform conditioned on NIPM(X , Y ), i.e., using Y we can merge X into a uniform random string which keeps the independence property over X even with a tampered seed Y .
Our starting point is the following simple observation. Let (X, X ) be two correlated weak sources and (R, R ) be two correlated random variables such that (X, X ) is independent of (R, R ). Let R be uniform and take any strong seeded extractor Ext, consider Z = Ext(X, R) and Z = Ext(X , R ). Assume the length of the output of Ext is small enough. Then Z is close to uniform given Z if either of the following two conditions holds: R is uniform given R or X has sufficient min-entropy conditioned on X . Indeed, in the first case, we can first fix R , and argue that conditioned on this fixing, Z is a deterministic function of X . We can now further fix Z , and conditioned on this fixing, X still has enough entropy left (since the length of Z is small). Note that at this point R is still uniform and independent of X, thus Z = Ext(X, R) is close to uniform given Z . In the second case, we can first fix X , and conditioned on this fixing X still has enough entropy left. Now since Ext is a strong extractor, we know that Z = Ext(X, R) is close to uniform even given R. Since we have already fixed X and (R, R ) is independent of (X, X ), this means that Z is also close to uniform even given R and X , which gives us Z = Ext(X , R ). Now we can describe our basic NIPM. The construction is actually simple in the sense that it is essentially an alternating extraction process between X and Y, except that in each alternation we use a new row from X. Specifically, we first take a small slice S 1 from X 1 , and apply a strong seeded extractor to obtain R 1 = Ext(Y, S 1 ); we then use R 1 to extract from X 2 and obtain S 2 = Ext(X 2 , R 1 ). Now we continue and obtain R 2 = Ext(Y, S 2 ) and S 3 = Ext(X 3 , R 2 )... .The final output of our merger will be
To see why this construction works, first assume that the length of each S i , R i is small enough. Let j be the first index in [L] such that X j is uniform even conditioned on X j . Then, we can fix all the intermediate random variables S 1 , S 1 , R 1 , R 1 , S 2 , S 2 , R 2 , R 2 . . . S j−1 , S j−1 , and conditioned on these fixings we know that: 1. (R j−1 , R j−1 ) are deterministic functions of (Y, Y ), and thus independent of (X, X ); 2. R j−1 is close to uniform; 3. X j still has enough entropy conditioned on X j . Now, by the first case we discussed above, this implies that S j is close to uniform given S j . From this point on, by using the second case we discussed above and an inductive approach, we can argue that for all subsequent t ≥ j, we have that R t is close to uniform given R t and S t is close to uniform given S t . Thus the final output S L is close to uniform given S L .
Note that this construction can work even if Y is a very weak random source instead of being uniform or having high min-entropy rate. However this basic approach will require the min-entropy of Y to be at least O(L log(m/ )), which is pretty large if L is large. We next describe a way to reduce this entropy requirement, in the case where Y is uniform or has high min-entropy rate.
The idea is that, rather than merging the L rows in one step, we merge them in a sequence of steps, with each step merging all the blocks of some rows. Thus, it will take us roughly log L log steps to merge the entire matrix. Now first assume that Y is uniform, then in each step we will not use the entire Y to do the alternating extraction and merging, but just use a small slice of Y for this purpose. That is, we will first take a small slice Y 1 and use this slice to merge L/ blocks of X, where each block has rows; we then take another slice Y 2 of Y and use this slice to merge L/ 2 new blocks, where each block has rows, and so on. The advantage of this approach is that now the entropy consumed in each merging step is contained in the slice Y i (and Y i ), and won't affect the rest of Y much.
As we discussed before, we need to make sure that each slice Y i has min-entropy O( log(m/ )) conditioned on the fixing of all previous (Y j , Y j ). As a result, we need to set |Y i+1 | ≥ 2|Y i | + O( log(m/ )). It suffices to take |Y i | = c i log(m/ ) for some constant c > 2. We know that the whole merging process is going to take roughly log L log steps, so the total length (or min-entropy) of Y is something like c log L log log(m/ ). We just need to choose a proper to minimize this quantity. A simple calculation shows that the best is roughly such that log = √ log L, which gives us a seed length of 2
. This gives us the NIPM in Theorem 8.
It is not difficult to see that this argument also extends to the case where Y is not perfectly uniform but has high min-entropy rate (e.g., 1 − o (1) 
B. Non-malleable extractor with almost optimal seed
The NIPM in Theorem 8 is already enough to yield our construction of a non-malleable extractor with almost optimal seed length. Specifically, given an (n, k) source X, an independent seed Y, and a tampered seed Y , we follow the approach of one of the authors' previous work [10] by first obtaining an advice of length L = O(log(n/ )). Let the advice generated by (X, Y) be S and the advice generated by X, Y be S . We have that with probability 1 − , S = S . Further, conditioned on (S, S ) and some other random variables, we have that X is still independent of (Y, Y ) and Y has high min-entropy rate. Now we take a small slice Y 1 of Y, and use X and Y 1 to generate a random matrix V with L rows, where the i'th row is obtained by doing a flip-flop alternating extraction (introduced in [13] ) using the i'th bit of S. Similarly a matrix V is generated using X and Y 1 . The flip-flop alternating extraction guarantees that each row in V is close to uniform, and moreover if the i'th bit of S and S are different, then V i is close to uniform even given V i . Note that conditioned on the fixing of (Y 1 , Y 1 ), we have that (V, V ) are deterministic functions of X, and are thus independent of (Y, Y ). Furthermore Y still has high min-entropy rate.
At this point we can just use our NIPM and Y to merge V into a uniform string Z, which is guaranteed to be close to uniform given Z (obtained from (V , Y )). The seed length of Y will be O(log(n/ )) + 2
O(
√ log log(n/ )) log(k/ ). A careful analysis shows that the final error will be O( log(n/ )). Thus we need to set the error parameter slightly smaller in order to achieve a desired final error , but that does not affect the seed length much. Altogether this gives us a seed length and entropy requirement of 2 O( √ log log(n/ )) log(n/ ), as in Theorem 1.
C. Further improvements in various aspects
We can further improve the non-malleable independence preserving merger and non-malleable extractor in various aspects. For this purpose, we observe that our NIPM starts with a basic merger for rows and then use roughly 
This gives us Theorem 10. Applying these NIPMs to non-malleable extractors as outlined above, we get Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
D. Independence preserving merger with weak random seed
We now use our NIPM from Theorem 8 to construct a standard independence preserving merger with weak random seed, an object introduced in [20] . Suppose we are given (X, X ) as described above and an independent random variable Y. Here Y can be a very weak source, so our first step is to convert it to a uniform (or high min-entropy rate) seed.
To do this, our observation is that since we know that each row in X is uniform, we can just take a small slice W of the first row X 1 , and apply a strong seeded extractor to Y to obtain Z = Ext(Y, W), which is guaranteed to be close to uniform. However by doing this we also created a correlated Z = Ext(Y, W ) where W is a slice of X 1 . Note that conditioned on the fixing of (W, W ) we have (X, X ) is independent of (Z, Z ), each row of X still has high min-entropy, and the "good" row X j still has high min-entropy even given X j . We now take a small slice V of Z, and use it to extract from each row of X to obtain another matrix X. Similarly we also have a slice V from Z and obtain X . We can now argue that conditioned on the fixing of (V, V ), (X, X ) is independent of (Z, Z ), each row of X is close to uniform, and the "good" row X j is close to uniform even given X j . Moreover Z still has high min-entropy rate.
Thus, we have reduced this case to the case of an independence preserving merger with a tampered high min-entropy rate seed. We can therefore apply our NIPM to finish the construction. It is also not difficult to see that our construction can be extended to the case where we have X, X 1 , . . . , X t instead of having just X and X .
E. Improved multi-source extractor
We can now apply our independence preserving merger with weak random seed to improve the multisource extractor construction in [20] . Our construction follows the framework of that in [20] , except that we replace their independence preserving merger with ours.
Essentially, the key step in the construction of [20] , and the only step which takes O(1/δ) independent (n, log 1+δ n) sources (if we only aim at achieving constant or slightly sub-constant error) is to merge a matrix with O(log n) rows using (n, log 1+δ n) sources. For this purpose and since the error of the merger needs to be 1/poly(n), the independence preserving merger in [20] uses two additional sources in each step to reduce the number of rows by a factor of log δ n. Thus altogether it takes 2/δ sources. Our merger as described above, in contrast, only requires one extra independent source with min-entropy at least O(log n)+ 2
O(
√ log log n) log n = log 1+o(1) n. Therefore, we obtain a multi-source extractor for an absolute constant number of (n, log 1+o(1) n) sources, which outputs one bit with constant (or slightly sub-constant) error.
The improved two-source extractors are obtained directly by plugging in our improved t-non-malleable extractors to the constructions in [11] , [40] . (log(n/ )) 3+o (1) Theorem 3 (log(n/ )) 3+o(1) log(n/ )2 2
√ log log log(n/ )) 
